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On August 10, 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC") filed a brief amicus curiae in support of 
plaintiff in this case. That brief reiterates most of the 
legal arguments contained in the Brief for Appellee. In this 
supplemental brief, Price Waterhouse will respond to the EEOC's 
amicus brief only to the extent that it has not already 
addressed the import of the EEOC's arguments in its Reply Brief. 
I 
LIABILITY 
Price Waterhouse has demonstrated that the District 
Court erred in failing to evaluate or weigh the evidence on 
remand under the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
instead applying a rule that presumptively disqualified all of 
Price Waterhouse's proof that its 1983 decision to defer 
plaintiff's partnership candidacy was based upon a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory criterion. Appellant's Br. at 19-21. The 
EEOC in its brief amicus curiae does not take issue with Price 
Waterhouse's analysis of the District Court's approach on 
remand. Indeed, the EEOC agrees that that was the approach 
taken below, "embrace[s]" it,l/ and urges this Court to adopt 
it. 
l/ EEOC's Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Strike EEOC's Brief as Amicus Curiae ("Opp. to M~t. to Strike") at 4. 
The EEOC, like the District Court and plaintiff, has 
been unable to identify a single instance in which a court has 
applied such a rule of evidence in a mixed-motive or other 
multiple causation case in which the burden of proof has been 
shifted to the defendant. In fact, the Supreme Court's 
decision rejecting the "elevated standard of proof" initially 
imposed upon Price Waterhouse in this case pointedly emphasized 
that "[c]onventional rules of civil litigation generally apply 
in Title VII cases," Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 109 s. Ct. 
1775, 1792-93 {1989), and expressly stated that its decision 
did not "traverse new ground." Id. at 1789; ~ tl.§Q id. at 
1795 {White, J., concurring in the judgment). The Supreme 
Court plurality opinion suggested that an employer could meet 
its burden simply by "present[ing] some objective evidence as 
to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible 
motive," id. at 1791, and Justice White added that "where . 
the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been 
taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample 
proof." Id. at 1796. 
Although Price Waterhouse introduced both kinds of 
evidence in the 1985 trial {see Appellant's Br. at 14-21), the 
District Court on remand fashioned a novel evidentiary rule 
that not only shifts the burden of proof to the employer in 
mixed-motive cases, but creates a presumption that the employer 
violated Title VII that is virtually irrebuttable. This Court 
should reject the EEOC's contention that this new and 
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essentially unattainable standard of proof should be applied in 
this and future Title VII cases. 
The EEOC asserts that the District Court's approach 
was proper here because, according to the EEOC, a 
discriminatory "double standard" and "sexual stereotyping 
permeated the [partnership] evaluation process, affecting not 
only those criticisms [of plaintiff] that were overtly sexist 
but also some that were couched in neutral terms." EEOC's Br. 
at 12, 14 (emphasis added). 2/ However, in 1985 the District 
Court found only that "unconscious" sex stereotyping played an 
"undefined role"l/ in the-partnership selection process, and 
on remand in 1990 the District Court refused even to evaluate 
or consider the gender-neutral criticisms of plaintiff as part 
of the evidentiary equation. The court did not, as the EEOC 
2/ The EEOC states that "a number of partners opposed Hopkins' 
candidacy" and "[s]ome of these partners made critical comments 
... which were couched in terms of her sex." EEOC's Br. at 
3-4. But this is not a correct summary of the record. Only 
one "opponent" of plaintiff's candidacy commented in language 
that has been identified in this litigation as gender-related. 
Compare Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 463, 466 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), with App. at 37-49. 
Moreover, the District Court never purported to identify 
criticisms that were, as the EEOC puts it, "overtly sexist," 
EEOC's Br. at 12, but rather found only that a small number of 
criticisms were phrased in gender-related terms that "suggested 
sex stereotyping." Findings, App. at 222; ™ Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.D.C. 1985). The 
District Court found, at most, that these few comments were the 
product of "unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related to 
sex." 618 F. Supp. at 1118. 
l/ 618 F. Supp. at 1118. 
maintains, determine that either those comments or the 
partnership selection process itself were "permeated" by sex 
. 4/ stereotyping.-
Although the Supreme Court remanded this case for the 
determination whether Price Waterhouse "had proved" its part of 
the case under the "less stringent" preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof, 109 S. Ct. at 1793, the EEOC 
incorrectly discerns from the Supreme Court's mandate a 
requirement that Price Waterhouse introduce additional evidence 
on remand on the issue of liability. EEOC's Br. at 14-15. 
Thus, for example, the EEOC states that "Price Waterhouse could 
not rely on the facially neutral criticisms of Hopkins' 
personality" without introducing "some evidence" that the 
partners who criticized plaintiff were not motivated by 
discriminatory animus. EEOC's Br. at 14. But the EEOC wholly 
ignores the wealth of documentary and testimonial evidence that 
Price Waterhouse introduce~ on this precise issue( in the 1985 
trial, including uncontroverted direct testimony ttom. . some of 
1/ It was never shown that the gender-neutral complaints about 
plaintiff's treatment of peers and subordinates were in fact 
tainted in any way by discrimination. See Appellant's Br. at 
20; Reply Br. at 2-3. Plaintiff's expert testified that some 
of the comments might have been influenced by sex stereotyping, 
but was unable "to determine whether or not any particular 
reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereotypes." 
618 F. Supp. at 1117. Although the District Court found it 
"impossible" to label any particular criticism as being 
motivated by plaintiff's sex based upon such testimony, 618 F. 
Supp. at 1118, it allowed that testimony to sweep aside and 
nullify every gender-neutral criticism of plaintiff's conduct 
and interpersonal skills. 
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plaintiff's strongest supporters and critics. See Appellant's 
Br. at 15-19. The EEOC does not explain why that "evidence of 
the partners' motivations"~/ was not -- at the very least 
sufficient to permit Price Waterhouse also to rely upon 
"facially neutral criticisms of Hopkins' personality" on remand. 
II 
REMEDY 
The EEOC argues that the language of Title VII "is 
broad enough to authorize" the District Court's partnership 
order because it is of the same "general kind, class or nature" 
as an order reinstating an employee. EEOC's Br. at 20. That 
contention is completely devoid of logic and any understanding 
of the nature of a professional partnership. "The relationship 
among ... partners differs markedly from that between 
employer and employee." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 
69, 79-80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
~I EEOC's Opp. to Mot. to Strike at 4. In its amicus brief, 
the EEOC flatly states that Price Waterhouse failed to 
introduce any testimony at all during these proceedings from 
partners who criticized plaintiff's interpersonal skills. 
EEOC's Br. at 14-15. Price Waterhouse pointed out in its 
Motion to Strike the EEOC's amicus brief, at 4, that it did in 
fact introduce such testimony in 1985, and that the EEOC's 
statement in that regard was incorrect. The EEOC then changed 
course, disclaiming any intention to comment on the 1985 record 
and, apparently, arguing that the evidence already in the 
record was .iQ.sQ facto irrelevant and that Price Waterhouse 
could not rely upon it unless it reintroduced such testimony on 
remand. Opp. to Mot. to Strike at 4. It did not elaborate 
upon or attempt to justify this peculiar theory. One possible 
explanation is that the EEOC does not know what is in the 
record in this case because apparently it did not read it. 
In fact, the EEOC itself has effectively recognized that 
partnership status is different in kind from employee status 
and that therefore "partners are not ... covered by Title 
VII." EEOC's Br. at 21.Q/ The EEOC therefore cannot 
rationally contend that an order compelling the creation of a 
new partnership is in the same general class of relief as an 
order reinstating an employee into an existing employment 
position. 
As Price Waterhouse pointed out in its opening brief, 
at 30, the same logic that has led the courts and the EEOC to 
conclude that Title VII does not apply to the relationship 
among partners precludes a construction of Title VII to 
authorize partnership as a remedy. The EEOC responds that the 
"same argument" (EEOC's Br. at 21) has been rejected in a line 
of cases interpreting the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA"). However, the EEOC's reliance upon such cases is 
misplaced. 
For example, in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 
U.S. 168 (1973), the only apparent change resulting from the 
National Labor Relations Board's decision to reinstate a 
discharged employee as an "independent contractor" was that the 
"driver-salesman" in question was given the opportunity to 
QI Notwithstanding the EEOC's equivocation in its brief, at 21 
& n.14, its own administrative decisions make clear that where 
partners "are the co-owners who control and manage the 
business" they cannot "be considered ... employee[s] under 
Title VII." EEOC Dec. No. 85-4 (Mar. 18, 1985). 
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distribute soft drinks on a commission, as opposed to a 
straight salary, basis. See id. at 187-88. In Oil, Chemical 
and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), this Court concluded 
that a discharged employee should have been reinstated as a 
shift manager in charge of four or five employees at a helium 
extraction plant. Id. at 589. Although both of these cases 
involved reinstatement of an employee to a position not covered 
by the NLRA, neither case required promotion to a high level 
executive or policymaking position. Nor did they involve any 
sort of transition from employment to ownership status. Such 
cases therefore do not begin to answer the question whether 
Congress intended to authorize the courts to order the creation 
and continuation of professional partnerships under Title 
vrr. 11 
The EEOC also contends that the District Court's 
partnership order was an appropriate exercise of discretion 
under the facts of this case. Although the EEOC accepts that 
plaintiff's "misrepresentation of statements by the chairman of 
the firm in an effort to pressure [partners] into supporting 
her partnership bid" caused "the firm to decide not to 
11 The EEOC also cites NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 
235 {2d Cir. 1953), where the employee had already been 
promoted to assistant foreman. The question before the court 
was the employee's entitlement to lost earnings related to the 
delay in his promotion caused by the union bringing charges 
against him for returning to work during a strike at the 
plant. Reinstatement was not an issue in the case. 
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reconsider her for partnership," EEOC's Br. at 5 n.6, 16, it 
asserts that "[t]here is nothing inequitable" in compelling 
Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner. EEOC's Br. at 
16. However, as the EEOC appears to acknowledge (EEOC's Br. at 
16 n.11), this Court has previously recognized the "anomaly and 
injustice" of reinstating an employee whose misrepresentations 
called into question the employee's "reliability, veracity 
[and] good judgment." Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117, 
119 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981). Like 
the plaintiff in Williams, plaintiff in this case was the 
"responsible agent" in her· ultimate misfortune, "'generat[ing] 
[her] own fate."' Id. at 119. Irrespective of this Court"s 
determination of the constructive discharge issue, this fact 
alone should preclude the extraordinary and unprecedented 
d f t h . . th· S/ reme yo par ners ip in is case.-
~/ The EEOC incorrectly assumes that plaintiff's own conduct 
after the 1983 hold decision is only relevant to the 
partnership question in connection with the constructive 
discharge issue. It also attempts, and fails, to distinguish 
Williams on the grounds that that case "involved a plaintiff's 
request that he be reinstated to the same job that he had lost 
due to his own actions," EEOC's Br. at 16 n.11 (EEOC's 
emphasis), whereas here the plaintiff seeks to be installed in 
the new position of partner. That distinction is not only 
without factual support -- plaintiff in this case seeks to be 
placed in the partner position that her own actions 
precluded -- but it also is irrelevant to the question whether 
it is equitable or appropriate to order Price Waterhouse to 
install plaintiff in "a position of trust and responsibilty," 
Williams, 663 F.2d at 118, where her own intentional misconduct 
"removed any possibility that she would be accepted as a 
partner." Findings. App. at 242. 
- a -
.. 
Finally, the EEOC contends that partnership was the 
only effective "make whole" remedy available because "a 
monetary award . would not constitute complete relief." 
EEOC's Br. at 19. In support of this proposition, it asserts 
that "benefits accruing from a professional career are not 
measured in dollars alone -- there is also the benefit of 
prestige in being associated with an established firm." EEOC's 
Br. at 19. Title VII, however, was not intended to afford such 
intangible relief. Rather, "Title VII deals with legal 
injuries of an economic character." Albermarle Paper Co, v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (·1975) (emphasis added).~/ 
Furthermore, although opportunities for a position comparable 
to a Price Waterhouse partnership "clearly existed" (Findings, 
App. at 243-44), plaintiff "simply chose not to seek such a 
position." Id. at 247. Plaintiff's complete failure to 
mitigate after she left Price Waterhouse forecloses the 
argument that only a judicially mandated partnership will make 
her whole in this case. 
~/ The EEOC is thus left to rely upon a case decided under the 
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, Human Relations Commission v. 
Thorp Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. Cornrow. 295, 361 A.2d 497, 502 
(1976), for support for the argument that monetary relief is 
insufficient to make plaintiffs in partnership cases whole. 




This Court should reject the approach to evidence in 
mixed-motive cases advocated by the EEOC in its brief amicus 
curiae and reverse the judgment of liability against Price 
Waterhouse. Alternatively, if the Court does find Price 
Waterhouse liable, the partnership order should be dissolved 
and plaintiff's relief limited to back pay for a narrow period 
following the 1983 decision to defer her partnership candidacy. 
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